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Introductory Comments 
 
I chose the topic of forgiveness for this presentation. It was the subject of my very 
first philosophical essay, a very long one of 58 pages that I wrote between 1957 
and 1959, between age 12 and 14. I had read (enthusiastically devoured) before a 
very profound but the most difficult work of Hildebrand, the Metaphysik der 
Gemeinschaft, and prior to that some works of Plato and some ethical and 
epistemological writings of Hildebrand, as well as some writings of Adolf 
Reinach.1   In what follows I will add little about forgiveness that is not 
                                                             
 Dr. JOSEF SEIFERT, Dietrich von Hildebrand Chair for Realist Phenomenology, Iap-Ifes. 
Presentation in the first Dietrich von Hildebrand Schülerkreis Meeting Steubenville, Ohio, 
July 9-14, 2017 
1 Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft. Untersuchungen über Wesen und Wert der Gemeinschaft, 
3., vom Verf. durchgesehene Aufl., Dietrich von Hildebrand, Gesammelte Werke IV 
(Regensburg: J. Habbel, 1975). I read the book in its second edition: (Regensburg: Verlag 
Josef Habbel, 1955). During my work on forgiveness, I read Hildebrand’s book Christian 
Ethics. (New York: David McKay, 1953/Toronto: Musson, 1954/London: Thames & 
Hudson, 1954); Deutsch: Christliche Ethik (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1959). The second edition 
of both the English and German book was published under the title Ethics. I had also read 
Dietrich von Hildebrand, Die Umgestaltung in Christus. Über christliche Grundhaltung, in 
the first or second edition. 5th ed., (St. Ottilien: Eos Verlag, 1988). Transformation in 
Christ. On the Christian Attitude of Mind, last edition with a new sub-title: Transformation 
in Christ. Our Path to Holiness. Reprint of 1948 (New Hampshire: Sophia Institute Press. 
1989). I also knew somewhat Adolf Reinach’s „Über Phänomenologie“, in: Adolf 
Reinach, Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Ausgabe mit Kommentar, Bd. I: Die Werke, Teil I: 
Kritische Neuausgabe (1905-1914), Teil II: Nachgelassene Texte (1906-1917); Bd. II: 
Kommentar und Textkritik, hrsg.v. Karl Schuhmann und Barry Smith (München und 
Wien:  Philosophia Verlag, 1989), Bd. I, ibid., pp. 531-550; in English: 'Concerning 
Phenomenology,' transl. from the German ("Über Phänomenologie") by Dallas Willard, 
The Personalist 50 (Spring 1969), pp. 194-221. Reprinted in Perspectives in Philosophy, 
ed. Robert N. Beck (New York: Holt, Reinhart, & Winston, 1961 and 1969). 
2 JOSEF SEIFERT 
 
Journal of East-West Thought 
 
contained in this early essay of mine. I will chiefly order it a bit more and restrict 
myself to summarize in English what I say on the first nine of 58 pages on the 
topic in German. 
Doing this, I omit a long part of the original essay on the relation and 
difference between repentance and asking for forgiveness and other parts 
contained in the earlier essay: Analyses of examples of Starez Zosima’s asking for 
forgiveness in Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karamazov2 and of Creusa’s asking for 
forgiveness in Grillparzer’s Medea. 
On the impossibility of forgiving a person who is eternally remaining evil 
(like the devil and the damned). 
On pseudo-forgiving from pride instead of from love. 
On the summit of pagan forgiveness in Socrates and Antigone. 
On the newness of the Christian forgiveness. 
On the difference between hating injustice and hating the person who 
commits it. 
On the different kinds of synchorein, of forgiving by seeing a wrong done to 
us from the side of the wrongdoer. 
On the relation between happiness and forgiving, peace and forgiving, 
reconciliation and forgiving. 
On the difference between the gift of being asked to forgive and of 
forgiving. 
On why forgiveness does not contradict justice. 
On legal clemency (pardoning) and forgiveness. 
Morality and forgiveness. 
On the psychological and moral obstacles to asking for forgiveness. 
On the nature and depth of forgiving someone for the harm he caused me by 
offending a loved one. 
On free will and heart in forgiveness. 
On the difference between reproaches based on justice and others based on 
love. 
On the radical newness of the Christian virtue of forgiveness in comparison 
with natural forgiveness; and yet the fulfilment of natural forgiveness in the 
Christian virtue of forgiveness; and on many other topics. 
                                                             
2  Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov. Tr. Constance Garnett (London: 
William Heineman, Ltd., 1912), Part II, Book VI, chap. 2, pp. 307-308.  
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I see the signs of satisfaction, and feel in my heart the deep relief, of Crosby 
Father and Son over my announcing all the parts of my essay that I omit here and 
over my not even completing their mere and truly frighteningly long list. 
Hildebrand, a close friend of my parents from times before my birth, read this 
essay of my earliest youth carefully and discussed it with me at length. It was the 
basis for his tremendous encouragement for me to study philosophy and to 
dedicate my life to it – in the service of God. At age 14, it was hard for my 
parents to dissuade me from disrupting my high-school studies in order to go to 
New York to participate in Hildebrand’s classes at Fordham University before his 
retirement, in order to draw all truth and wisdom from him I could.3 For me, 
writing this essay was the overwhelming experience of philosophizing about 
things themselves, the very goal of my later studies of philosophy and of 
founding The International Academy of Philosophy, with its motto Diligere 
veritatem omnem et in omnibus, to love all truth and to love it in everything.4 
One may say that writing this essay was an experience of falling in love with 
philosophizing, of being inebriated by the marvelous experience to discover 
eternal truths in philosophy. 
I chose this topic for the first meeting of the Schülerkreis also because 
Hildebrand posed to me some deep questions about forgiveness, which I have not 
quite solved since 60 years and hope to solve finally with your help. I will also 
point out some deep contributions concerning forgiveness Hildebrand made in his 
posthumously published Moralia and some differences between his philosophy of 
forgiveness and mine. Now to the essay itself: 
What Forgiveness is Not.  
Some philosophers claim that forgiveness is just the cessation of the anger, 
aversion, indignation, bitterness or even, in cases of grave wrongs, hatred which I 
feel towards another person who has committed some offense or injustice against 
                                                             
3 I owe also religiously speaking very much to Hildebrand to have overcome a crisis of my 
faith during these years. 
4 The International Academy of Philosophy in Texas 1980, The International Academy of 
Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein 1986, and at the The International Academy 
of Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein and at the Pontificia Universidad 
Católica de Chile  Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2004, and my involvement in 
the founding of its fourth Campus, the Academia Internacional de Filosofía en el 
Principado de Liechtenstein y en el Instituto de Filosofía Edith Stein (2011-). 
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me, and the renewal of my previous benevolent intention towards him. Others 
claim that forgiveness consists in some declaration that the offense and injustice I 
have suffered are not so bad after all. “No pasa nada,” “Everything is quite 
alright!” Though I cannot yet clearly say what forgiving is, I can clearly 
understand that these and similar “explanations” of what forgiving is are false. I 
think there is no definition of what forgiving is. Nonetheless, each of us in some 
fashion knows what it is. Moreover, though we cannot define forgiving through 
something else, it being an urphenomenon,5 we may ask ourselves what its 
characteristics are and eventually give some “essential definition” of forgiveness 
in terms of its essential characteristics. How does it differ from other acts, and 
what are the conditions and the effects of this peculiar deed? 6 In this way, the 
essence of forgiveness will gradually disclose itself more clearly to our minds if 
we open, in the fundamental attitude of philosophical wonder, our intellect to 
reality.7 
What Is Forgiveness? 
It is clear that forgiveness is something beautiful and positive and not the mere 
                                                             
5 See my explanation, and comments on the origin of this term in Goethe, in Josef Seifert, 
Discours des Méthodes. The Methods of Philosophy and Realist Phenomenology, 
(Frankfurt / Paris / Ebikon / Lancaster / New Brunswick: Ontos-Verlag, 2009). 
6 See on this also a longer treatment of different kinds of definition in Josef Seifert, Sein 
und Wesen. Philosophie und Realistische Phänomenologie/ Philosophy and Realist 
Phenomenology. Studien der Internationalen Akademie für Philosophie im Fürstentum 
Liechtenstein/Studies of the International Academy of Philosophy in the Principality 
Liechtenstein, (Hrsg./Ed.), Rocco Buttiglione and Josef Seifert, Band/Vol. 3  
(Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996), ch. 1. 
7 We have in mind here a specifically philosophical method of grasping the intelligible 
essence of forgiveness as distinct from an empirical psychological, sociological or 
historical-cultural investigation that considers very different aspects of forgiveness. This is 
not to exclude that also the sociological and psychological investigations necessarily 
presuppose certain philosophical insights and are using, or should at least use, 
philosophical methods in order to identify and place the empirically given psychological, 
sociological, or historical-cultural aspects of forgiveness. See Josef Seifert, Discours des 
Méthodes. The Methods of Philosophy and Realist Phenomenology, (Frankfurt / Paris / 
Ebikon / Lancaster / New Brunswick: Ontos-Verlag, 2009). 
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cessation of some negative feelings.
8
 It is likewise evident that, preceding 
forgiveness, a real offense or injustice must have occurred in order for 
forgiveness to have meaning. Therefore, as soon as I declare that the offense or 
injustice I suffered was not bad at all, I deny the condition for a meaningful act of 
forgiving. This touches two important points about forgiveness:  
1. Perceiving that one person has committed a wrong against another one is 
not enough for forgiveness. A wrongdoing against a third person could only be 
the object of indignation or wrath, or of a wish for a change of heart of the person 
who offended the other one, but not of forgiveness. If we witness a crime 
committed against another person, at least a person with whom we have no 
special solidarity such that each offense of him or her offends us as well 
personally, we cannot forgive the perpetrator of such an offense. We cannot 
forgive the Nazis for having murdered 7 million, or Stalin for having murdered 
many more persons. If a wrong has been done, however, to our friend, wife, or 
child, and these evils become evils for us because they are evils for them; we can 
forgive based on a unique benevolence of love. We can forgive the trespasser 
having wronged us by wronging persons we love, without being able to substitute 
thereby that primary forgiveness that solely the directly offended person can 
                                                             
8 Writing this, I was no doubt inspired by what Adolf Reinach writes on forgiveness in 
“Über Phänomenologie”, in: Adolf Reinach, Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Ausgabe mit 
Kommentar, Bd. I: Die Werke, Teil I: Kritische Neuausgabe (1905-1914), Teil II: 
Nachgelassene Texte (1906-1917), S. 531-550 (which I read in the 1951 edition by Kösel), 
'Concerning Phenomenology,' transl. from the German ("Über Phänomenologie") by 
Dallas Willard, The Personalist 50 (Spring 1969), pp. 194-221. Reprinted in Perspectives 
in Philosophy, ed. Robert N. Beck (New York: Holt, Reinhart, & Winston, 1961 and 
1969), and on promises in “Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes”, in: 
Reinach, Adolf, Sämtliche Werke. Texkritische Ausgabe in zwei Bänden, Bd. I: Die 
Werke, Teil I: Kritische Neuausgabe (1905-1914), Teil II: Nachgelassene Texte 
(1906-1917); hrsg.v. 
Karl Schuhmann & Barry Smith (München und Wien: Philosophia Verlag, 1989), 
141-278; “The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law,“ transl. by J. F. Crosby, Aletheia III 
(1983), pp. xxxiii-xxxv; 1-142, and by what Hildebrand writes on the topic in Die 
Menschheit am Scheideweg, (Regensburg: Habbel, 1955). “Die rechtliche und sittiche 
Sphäre in ihrem Eigenwert und Zusammenhang”. 
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realize.
9
 
2. Nor could we forgive a person who has inflicted harm on us by being 
thrown on us, and thereby hurting us, but without any free intention or action on 
his part to do us harm. To use another example: to the extent to which a person 
would be under hypnotic power, magic spells, or demonic mental enslavement, 
we cannot forgive him or her even the most horrible misbehavior and infidelity, at 
least to the extent to which these factors completely enslaved a person, depriving 
her of her reasoning powers and free will. This might never happen completely in 
reality, but if such a bewitchment were to happen, as some believe it can happen, 
we would have no cause to forgive. 
One sees here the necessary and mysterious laws that govern not only the 
object of empirical science but also, and more rigorously, the objects of 
philosophical knowledge. (Of course, the laws empirical science investigates are 
very different from a priori or essentially necessary laws mathematics or 
philosophy investigate.)10 
The condition for my forgiving, then, is that an objective evil was inflicted 
on me, a promise or vow was broken, or another offense has been committed 
against me freely by another person. Now, on a first level, the appropriate 
response to this situation is reproach, indignation, or a demand for the other’s 
apology, or – if his deed is a crime – a demand for the other’s due punishment. 
This is the appropriate response of justice. However, the response of forgiving the 
other person is more beautiful and deeper and has further conditions in the person 
                                                             
9 This thought was not found in the original essay. It goes back to the magnificent chapter 
7 of the Wesen der Liebe of Hildebrand, on which I have also written. See Dietrich von 
Hildebrand, The Nature of Love, trans. John Crosby and John Henry Crosby (South Bend, 
Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2009), ch. 7, and Josef Seifert, “Dietrich von Hildebrand on 
Benevolence in Love and Friendship: A Masterful Contribution to Perennial Philosophy,” 
in Journal of Philosophical Inquiry and Discussion: Selected Papers on the Philosophy of 
Dietrich von Hildebrand, Quaestiones Disputatae 3, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 85–106. Also 
audio/video registration  
http://www.hildebrandlegacy.org/main.cfm?r1=7.50&r2=1.00&r3=1.00&r4=0.00&id=109
&level=3. 
10  See Dietrich von Hildebrand, Che cos’è la filosofia?/What Is Philosophy?, 
English-Italian, 4th ed. (Milano: Bompiani Testi a fronte, 2001). 
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who forgives.
11
 
A Two-fold Offense: against God (Sin) and against a Human Person 
(Doing him some Wrong), and A Twofold Disharmony 
In order to understand better forgiveness as well as the effects of forgiveness, 
we have to comprehend that offending another person or committing some 
injustice against her is cause of a twofold offense and a twofold disharmony in 
the moral-metaphysical sphere. We should distinguish at this point likewise the 
offense itself from the disharmony between persons that flows from it. We 
understand their difference best when we consider the wrongdoing against 
another human person. The offense can be forgiven, at least as far as this is 
possible for the offended person alone, by some inner solitary act of forgiveness 
such as the forgiveness of St. Stephan addressed to those who stoned him to death. 
The disharmony, however, can solely be dissolved by some interpenetration or 
spiritual meeting between the act of forgiving with an act of regret, or an asking 
for forgiveness, by the person of the offender. Now let us consider more closely 
the two offenses and the two disharmonies that follow from them. 
1. The person of the offender of another human person incurs guilt by 
acting against the eternal laws of which Antigone speaks in Sophocles’ play of the 
same name. When we look more deeply into this offending against the “eternal 
law”, against what justice, kindness etc. demand from us, we recognize that this 
offense is not directed only against some impersonal eternal laws of which 
Antigone might be speaking. Rather, it is an offence committed against a personal 
God, who embodies moral goodness itself. We can distinguish this offense of God 
that we call sin from guilt, the stain in the soul of the offender that results from 
sin. We can distinguish both from the further moment of the disharmony that is, 
in ultimate analysis, the consequence of sin, of an offense against God which 
results in some separation of the soul from the divine light. In the case of our 
consideration, an offense against another human being, sin, guilt, and a 
disharmony and violation of the bond between God and the soul, are inseparable 
from committing evil acts against another human being and result from them. 
2. This metaphysical-religious dimension of our wronging a fellow man is 
entirely beyond the reach of the offended or otherwise wronged human person. 
                                                             
11 Stephen Schwarz shows well in his quoted book that a person, for example parents, can 
forgive and nevertheless, not remit punishment. Of course, they can also punish without 
forgiving. Thus, these two acts are not necessarily interconnected. 
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Neither can I in any way absolve another person from his sin as offense of God, 
nor can I, through my act of forgiving, in any way dissolve the disharmony 
between the offending person and God. It is thus also philosophically evident 
what the Jews expressed when they reproached Jesus because he said to the 
paralytic whom he had cured: “Your sins are forgiven.” They insisted correctly: 
“God alone can forgive sins.” God alone can dissolve the disharmony that enters 
the world through sin.12 (Therefore, Jesus, absolving men from their sins, would 
have acted wrongly and blasphemed, if He was not God, which we, as Christians, 
believe he is).13  
3. On the other hand, there is an offense committed against another human 
person, as it were a “sin against him”. (One is reminded of the word of King Lear 
in Shakespeare that he is “more sinned against than sinning”). And inasmuch as 
this wrongdoing is directed against me, I can forgive it and in some sense delete 
the offense of the other person against me, the “sin against me”.14 Also the 
disharmony, the breaking of the bond between the offended human person and his 
offender, can be dissolved through the act of forgiving, although, as we shall see, 
neither this disharmony between us, nor the “guilt against us,” can be dissolved, 
nor the reconciliation and the renewal of our union and community can be 
achieved by the offended person’s forgiveness alone. 
                                                             
12 There is some human analogy to a forgiveness of objective sin in the legal sphere when 
a judge or a kind king or governor pardons (veniam dat) or gives amnesty to a criminal. 
The German word “begnadigen” brings this analogy out very well. A judge or a king, who 
decides to bestow grace (to begnadigen) a criminal, exercizes “mercy”. In a very beautiful 
passage from a letter of Don Quijote to Sancho Panza about his government on the island, 
and in the response and application Sacho gives to these pieces of advice of his master, this 
analogy between the grace bestowed on a criminal and the divine pardon is beautifully 
brought out by Cervantes. 
13 As Catholics, we believe that the power to forgive sins has been invested by God in the 
priest who, in the sacrament of confession, forgives sins, acts as it were in the name of 
God, and has received the power to absolve from sins which Christ have to the apostles in 
a very explicit way: “to whom you forgive their sins, they are forgiven”. 
14 On all these points, and on the essential difference Hildebrand sees between divine 
forgiveness of sin and human forgiveness, there was perfect agreement between 
Hildebrand and me. Disagreement between us arose, however, with respect to two other 
points, namely about: 
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In view of the truth about the two different things which we could call “the 
sin against God” and “the sin against me” (or the offense against God, and the 
offense against man) I can say: I forgive you. May God pardon you as well! 
i) Hildebrand’s assertion that forgiveness, in none of its forms, is a social act,  
I.e. an act that the other person has to perceive consciously, and to which he has 
to give a peculiar response for it to be realized and to achieve its effect. 
Hildebrand argues much later in his Moralia (published posthumously) that only, 
on the one hand, the Verlautbarung (declaration of forgiveness), and, on the other 
hand, reconciliation and restoration of the bond broken, or at least wounded, by 
wrong-doing, requires the special interaction between forgiving and asking for 
forgiveness that are, or entail, social acts. Forgiveness itself, however, Hildebrand 
considers to be a purely inner act that does not need to be perceived by its 
addressee. 
ii) Hildebrand argued, secondly, that forgiveness can on its own dissolve or  
destroy the bond of obligation (of debt) the offended person holds against his 
offender, without any regret of the offender.15  
                                                             
15 See Dietrich von Hildebrand, Moralia, pp. 335-336. Hildebrand uses as argument that 
we can even forgive the dead, and hence forgiveness cannot be a social act. However, this 
seems to presuppose two things: a) that no difference exists between a purely inner 
forgiveness and a forgiveness that addresses itself to another person; and b) that the 
deceased cannot perceive our forgiving them, which, for example, Plato denies, holding 
that the perpetrators of crimes against others can only be freed from their hard punishment 
of the yonder world, when their victims have pardoned them. See Plato’s Phaedo, 113 e – 
114c (transl. Jowett): 
 
Those again who have committed crimes, which, although great, are not 
irremediable--who in a moment of anger, for example, have done violence to a 
father or a mother, and have repented for the remainder of their lives, or, who 
have taken the life of another under the like extenuating circumstances--these 
are plunged into Tartarus, the pains of which they are compelled to undergo 
for a year, but at the end of the year the wave casts them forth--mere 
homicides by way of Cocytus, parricides and matricides by 
Pyriphlegethon--and they are borne to the Acherusian lake, and there they lift 
up their voices and call upon the victims whom they have slain or wronged, to 
have pity on them, and to be kind to them, and let them come out into the lake. 
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I held, on the contrary, that (a) the act of forgiving, like that of renouncing 
my claim to the fulfillment of a promise, must be perceived by the addressee. 
Moreover, I held that b) the act of forgiveness of the offended part alone is not 
only insufficient to restore harmony and dissolve the dissonance between 
offending and offended person (which Hildebrand recognizes and stresses 
strongly in his Moralia), but is also insufficient to dissolve the “certificate of 
debt”. It can certainly dissolve the “sin against me” and the resulting disharmony 
from one side, but it seems that, just as the demand for a just sanction, also that 
forgiveness that eliminates the certificate of debt and additionally may renounce 
any demand for a just punishment, is a social act and requires an appropriate 
response of the offender. 
The chief question or critique Hildebrand raised to the essay of my youth 
was that I argued that I couldn’t effectively forgive as long as the offender does 
not regret what he has done to me. Hildebrand pointed out to me the examples of 
Christ, St. Stephen and the prodigal son, where the act of forgiving is, or seems to 
be, entirely independent of the response of the wrongdoer and at least precede it. I 
objected that we could not be greater than God. If even God cannot forgive, not 
even in the sacrament of confession, an unrepentant sinner, how can we forgive 
an offender who identifies himself with his offense and does not ask for 
forgiveness or regret what he has done? 
This discussion led me to distinguish in my essay two kinds of forgiving, a 
point on which I seek especially your further clarifications, but which I wish to 
introduce by analyzing forgiving and its object in general more closely: 
On the Essence, Characteristics and Kinds of Forgiveness 
1. In forgiving, speaking quite generally, I do not simply respond to the evil 
deed, as perhaps in indignation or sadness over what another person has done, but 
                                                                                                                                          
And if they prevail, then they come forth and cease from their troubles; but if 
not, they are carried back again into Tartarus and from thence into the rivers 
unceasingly, until they obtain mercy from those whom they have wronged: for 
that is the sentence inflicted upon them by their judges. Those toowho have 
been pre-eminent for holiness of life are released from this earthly prison, and 
go to their pure home which is above, and dwell in the purer earth; and of 
these, such as have duly purified themselves with philosophy live henceforth 
altogether without the body, in mansions fairer still which may not be 
described, and of which the time would fail me to tell. 
ON FORGIVENESS 
 
11 
 
Journal of East-West Thought 
 
the addressee of my forgiveness is the other person who has offended or injured 
me. Forgiveness has, however, at the same time, besides the addressee, an object; 
a “what” I forgive him. Moreover, this object of forgiveness, distinct from the 
person whom I forgive, is not simply the harm or objective evil I have suffered. 
A young and saintly friend of mine, an African named Anthony, founder of a 
new order, who was deliberately infected with Aids by a dentist, from a motive of 
pure envy and evil vengeance for a good my friend did, could not forgive the 
dentist the objective evil of Aids he had inflicted on him. He has fully forgiven, 
however, “that the other person has inflicted this evil unto him,” when the dentist, 
on his deathbed, revealed his crime to my friend. My friend Anthony, thus, did 
not pardon the dentist Aids, nor the state of affairs that he had committed this 
horrible crime against him, but he pardoned him having committed a horrible act 
of wrongdoing against him. He pardoned the dentist his grave offense, having 
directed an act of injustice and mean vengeance against him. He forgave the 
vicious and revengeful dentist his wholly devious attack on his health and life. 
The object of this forgiveness, the “what he forgave” presupposes the intimate 
connection of the harm he had done him, result of his action, with his free will 
and responsibility for his action. Forgiveness thus responds to a wrongdoing 
against me inasmuch as it proceeds from the other person’s free will as cause of 
the objective evil for me. 
Forgiveness is a central act of the person in which she dissolves not only the 
resentment, anger, or even, in grave cases of offense, the hatred she might feel 
towards another person, who has inflicted an objective evil on her. Rather, 
through the act of forgiveness, the person who has suffered the offense, also when 
she nourished no grudge whatsoever against her offender before, nullifies or tears 
up, as it were, the peculiar "certificate of debt" that the offender (debtor) incurs 
not only towards God through his morally evil deed, but also toward the offended 
human person. He has this debt towards the person against whom he has 
committed an injustice, whom he has insulted, treated cruelly, or on whom he has 
inflicted another kind of harm.  
Thus we must ask how the act of forgiving, and its fruit, are possible, and 
how forgiving can achieve such a ripping of the “bond of obligation” or of the 
“promissory note” the offended person holds against his offender. We can also ask 
whether the described effects occur only in the case of a cooperation between the 
forgiving person and his offender or proceed simply from the act of forgiving and 
from the forgiving person. 
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2. At this point, we can distinguish two kinds of forgiveness that may help 
to settle the discussion I had with Hildebrand: an inner act of forgiving and an 
interpersonal or social act which Crespo in his book describes in a way that 
allowed him to call it to me a “proto-social act”16 of forgiving, to which we turn 
first. Besides the inner forgiveness in my heart, there is, I think, a peculiar act of 
forgiveness, which we might call a social act, or, with Stephen Schwarz, the 
“responsive act” of forgiveness. It is responsive when it follows a petition by the 
offender to be forgiven. In that case, it is a response not merely in the sense in 
which we respond to a question, but in the sense of grating a petition and 
fulfilling the request of being forgiven. This kind of “responsive forgiveness” 
directs itself to the other person and needs to be perceived by him. 
We might ask ourselves whether the “responsive forgiveness” of which 
Schwarz is speaking is only one very clear case of this act of forgiveness that is a 
social act in Reinach’s sense, i.e., that needs to be perceived by the other person 
to become real. For example, we might, as loving father or as loving son, already 
anticipate that through our explicit offering forgiveness to our child or to our 
father, the father or the child will see their wrong-doing and regret their offense 
against us. In this case, we could speak of an “anticipatory” instead of a 
“responsive” forgiveness.  The word “I forgive you”, the forgiveness that needs 
to reach its addressee to be what it is or intends to be, is an important part of the 
human forgiveness of a trespass committed against us. Of course, this forgiveness 
can also be expressed in other ways besides words; for example in a gesture, an 
embrace, or a handshake. 
I think this outward-directed forgiveness is far more than the social act of 
declaration, let alone of mere communication, of the inner act of forgiveness. No, 
the promissory note or debt of the other towards us is cancelled by this act. It is a 
speech-act or even an act through speaking. This forgiveness is definitely more 
than a mere “declaration” of a forgiveness I have realized in my heart. This inner 
forgiveness or readiness to pardon precedes such a declaration and is independent 
of the offender asking for forgiveness. Through the second kind of the social or 
proto-social act of forgiving, however, I am actually ripping the certificate of debt. 
Thus, through this act, something important happens in the interpersonal world, 
nothing less great than what happens when I renounce my claim that another 
                                                             
16 See Mariano Crespo, El perdón. Una investigación filosófica. 2nd corrected and 
enlarged ed. (Madrid: Encuentro 2016), pp. 121-127. 
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person fulfill his promise, and when I thus liberate him or her from the obligation 
the other person incurred by giving me his or her promise. In forgiveness, 
something else of no lesser importance happens. I dissolve an account of debt I 
hold against the other person. Forgiving occurs often “in response” to an act of 
asking for forgiveness and does, like answering another person’s petition to be 
freed from the bond his promise created, require that the other person perceives 
our act of forgiveness, through which he receives a great gift and relief from a 
debt he has towards us. 
I would add that this “social act of forgiving” does not only require, in this 
case, what Reinach says of all “social acts”,17 namely that the other person must 
“hear” or perceive my act of forgiveness. Rather, he has also, if he has not already 
asked for forgiveness, to accept it, he has to admit his fault, and, at least implicitly, 
ask for forgiveness. If he does not, I cannot strike out his debt nor forgive him in 
an interpersonally fruitful way. This seems to me quite analogous to how even 
God, although his mercy is always ready to forgive, cannot forgive sins to the 
unrepentant sinner.18 
This is not only impossible but an additional disharmony arises when the 
offender does not retract his offense and apologize, and hence does not accept the 
gift of forgiveness. In other words, a forgiveness that is not met by acceptance of, 
or is not preceded by asking for, forgiveness does not effectively make the other 
person forgiven. Moreover, it does not overcome the rift and debt of the other, but 
gives rise to a new rift and disharmony between the offender and the offended 
person.19 Thus, it seems clear that this interpersonal or social act of forgiving 
                                                             
17 See Adolf Reinach, „The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law,“ transl. by J. F. Crosby, 
Aletheia III (1983), pp. xxxiii-xxxv; 1-142. 
18 Consider the parable of Jesus about the lord, who remitted all debts to his servant upon 
his pleading (an image for God’s forgiveness of his sins and remitting of just 
punishments), and the servant who, released from his own debt, absolutely refuses to heed 
a similar plea directed to him by his fellow servant to forgive and to rip his “bond of 
obligation”. In response to this ungrateful and merciless act, the lord revokes his 
remittance of the debt and demands that the first servant be duely punished. Thus even 
God does not remit the debt in forgiveness if the debtor remaains eveil and refuses to 
forgive others. 
19 Like Hildebrand in his treatise on forgiveness in his Moralia, so also Mariano Crespo 
denies in ch. 5 of his book that there is a distinction between the two acts of forgiving I 
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needs much more than a perceiving of the forgiveness of the other person. It 
stands in need both of being heard and of being responded to. It is not only 
vernehmungsbedürftig but antwortbedürftig or bittebedürftig. 
3. There is, on the other hand, besides the interpersonal forgiveness that 
requires a cooperation between offender and offended person, an inner 
forgiveness in my heart, which is a solitary act, though directed at the offender. It 
differs from the forgiveness, which requires a mutual participation of offended 
and offending party. It is a “purely inner forgiveness in our heart” that can 
perfectly well occur without the offender asking the offended person for 
forgiveness or accepting the gift of forgiveness. This forgiveness is, on the one 
hand, the noblest and most sublime forgiveness. On the other hand, it does not 
reach its goal through itself alone, as it were. As long as the offender does not 
accept the gift of forgiveness and does not regret what he has done, forgiveness 
remains in our heart and does not reach him. Actually, one might even ask 
whether we can actually forgive in such a situation, or only have a complete 
readiness to forgive. 
In this case, forgiveness (like that of St Stephen and his prayer for God’s 
forgiveness for those who stoned him to death) remains a tremendous gift the 
person who forgives in his heart, and declares this forgiveness, offers. However, it 
does not become fruitful for the offender; it cannot do what it intends to do: to 
burn the note of obligation, and to make that the other person be truly forgiven. 
Again, we find here an analogy to divine forgiveness: the unrepentant sinner 
cannot be forgiven his sin. In an analogous way, the offended human person alone 
cannot destroy the promissory note nor dissolve the disharmony nor give rise to 
the reconciliation intended as a fruit of forgiveness, until the offender disavows 
his wrongdoing. 
4. This is connected with another important fact. In the natural moral order, 
forgiving is not strictly speaking something that I owe to another person; at least, 
the offender cannot claim a right to my forgiveness, he can only ask for it or plead 
for it. There is perhaps an exception to forgiveness being neither a moral nor a 
                                                                                                                                          
distinguish. I still think that there is clearly such a distinction. This follows from several of 
the points mentioned, especially clrearly from the fact that the inner forgiveness in one’s 
heart (and with one’s will) must be repeated often, is again and again threatened by the 
opposites of forgiveness, while for the outward forgiveness as social act applies con 
Hildebrand’s statement that I can forgive the same injury only once. 
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legal obligation, nor a right of the offender. It seems that toward a person who has 
a thousand times forgiven me my offenses, such as parents, a husband or wife 
whom I have repeatedly “sinned against” and been forgiven by them, I have an 
obligation to forgive, and the other person has acquired some right that I forgive 
him. There is a certain mutuality here, analogous to the mutuality of love. 
Even if we prescind from Christian Revelation, we can say that if we love the 
person who has offended us with a natural love, like parents love their children, 
or children love their parents, friends their friends, or husbands their wives, we 
will not only be prone to forgive. Rather we will feel a strict obligation to forgive, 
if we look at the other person’s love and perhaps, in gratitude, at her preceding 
multiple forgiveness of our offenses. We look to her in love, with the gaze of 
benevolent love and unique affirmation of the other person in her absolute value 
and lovability. If the other person deserves love, we may say, she deserves in the 
eyes of the loving person also forgiveness. (Somewhat paradoxically, in her own 
eyes, the offending person will feel not deserving forgiveness, as the parable of 
the prodigal son shows).20 
If the offense is grave and the evil done to the other definitive, such as in 
Anthony’s case, an offended person who is not filled with a supernatural love, as 
Anthony was, might think and feel that the other person does not deserve 
forgiveness. This often happens when parents of a murdered child absolutely 
refuse to forgive the murderer of their child.21 
5. Towards other persons, who have done me an irreversible wrong, and with  
whom no special bond or call to the mutuality of love and forgiveness unites me, 
(like to the murderer of my only child) I have, on a purely natural level, no strict 
obligation to forgive. Nor does the offender have a right to my forgiveness (while 
he has a duty to ask for forgiveness). In fact, without a deeper religious 
background, I may be unable to forgive. The offender cannot claim the 
forgiveness of the one whom he has offended as his right. Therefore, the Romans 
called the act of forgiveness “veniam dare” – bestowing a grace on the other. 
                                                             
20 So he got up and went to his father. But while he was still in the distance, his father saw 
him and was filled with compassion. He ran to his son, embraced him, and kissed him. The 
son declared, ‘Father, I have sinned against heaven and against you. I am no longer worthy 
to be called your son.’ But the father said to his servants, ‘Quick! Bring the best robe and 
put it on him. Put a ring on his finger and sandals on his feet.… 
21 This is dramatically depicted in the movie Dead Man Walking. 
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6. However, as Christian, I have towards God, whose mercy will forgive all  
of our sins if we implore His forgiveness, a strict obligation to forgive all those 
who trespass against us – completely and from all our heart. Thus this absence of 
a strict obligation to forgive all offenses against us in natural morality,22 changes 
radically in a supernatural perspective of Christian revelation. The infinite mercy 
and forgiveness we have all received from God obliges us strictly to forgive those 
who have offended us, as the parable of the forgiveness of the master and the 
unforgiving attitude of the evil servant and the “Our Father” petition teach us: 
“forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive those who trespass against us”. This 
unconditional inner forgiveness, however, neither the human nor the divine, 
cannot destroy the bond of obligation (of debt) nor achieve reconciliation and the 
previous community, as we have seen, without a response on the side of the 
person to be forgiven. The latter point is very strongly affirmed by Dietrich von 
Hildebrand in his Moralia. He even adds that the full interhuman reconciliation 
and restoration of the relationship which existed before the offense, requires the 
offender also repent the sin he has committed and is reconciled with God. 
7. Let us return to a purely human phenomenological investigation into 
forgiveness: Forgiveness, especially for great and horrible evils done to a person, 
is extremely difficult. Think of the woman-physician who was raped for years by 
a guard in Peru where she was held prisoner by a terrorist organization. Years 
later, the evildoer knelt down before her and asked her to forgive him; she forgave 
him from all her heart. Forgiveness - in such cases - requires that we do not only 
overcome pride, hatred, resentment, etc., etc., but also in a mysterious way go 
beyond the attitude of just reproaches and demands for atonement or punishment 
and become tremendously generous. It demands that love melts our heart to the 
point that we drop our demand for justice. 
However, this “dropping” our just claims and reproaches directed against the 
other person must not be superficially done in the sense of a “simple dropping of 
demands of justice”. Rather, the true forgiveness penetrates into the depth of the 
wrongdoing of another person against me, it recognizes fully that he deserves, 
especially if his transgression is grave, reproach or punishment and ought to 
desire himself some human interpersonal “atonement” of his “wrong (sin) 
committed against me.” At the same time, it recognizes that forgiveness is the 
                                                             
22 On this point, I differ from Stephen Schwarz, who claims that there is a universal moral 
obligation to forgive that addresses itself to all men and does not require Christian faith. 
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most adequate, the deepest and the most authentic response to the other person 
who has acted badly against me. 
8. We can add that the mystery of forgiveness is profoundly linked to the 
mystery of love. Only through love, forgiveness can be perfect and is even 
possible in cases of grave and terrible offenses. 
9. This is also connected with the answer to another deep problem regarding 
forgiveness. Is forgiving a mere act of the free will, is it an act of a dry will that 
stays fully within our power, or has it also an affective dimension, and, inasmuch 
as it involves an affective response, does not stand in our power? Is it also a 
forgiving in my heart, a unique affective and loving response to the other person? 
A being affected by the value of the person in spite of his evil deed, with which I 
do not identify him and to which I do not nail him down when I forgive him, 
seems necessary both for the purely inner, and for the interpersonal forgiveness, 
at least for their fullest realization that includes precisely “forgiving in one’s 
heart”.23 
10. The full fruitful interpersonal forgiveness and dissolving of the debt and 
disharmony between the offender and the offended person that results in a full 
reconciliation between both, does not only require being affected in love by the 
dignity and value of a person, but also being affected by his asking for 
forgiveness, by his regret. This affective dimension of forgiveness emerged 
beautifully in the example of the woman, the South American victim, who 
forgave her rapist his repeated and horrible rape, and in the greatness of her soul 
that made her forgive this rapist from all her heart. 
11. The respective roles of will and heart in forgiveness constitute perhaps 
also a chief difference between the “inner forgiveness” of the heart and the 
“social act of forgiving”. In the first one, the heart plays a very important role. 
The second one, in which I erase the certificate of debt I hold against my debtor, 
is more a deed of the free will. It seems that the distinction between two authentic 
acts of forgiveness and the irreducibility of interpersonal forgiveness to inner 
forgiveness, though denied by Hildebrand, can also be gathered from a deep 
observation Hildebrand himself makes and that does not apply to the inner 
                                                             
23 See on this affective dimension and “moral feelings” also Jean Hampton, “Forgiveness, 
Resentment, and Hatred,” en J. Murphy and J. Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 35-87. 
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forgiveness of the heart but only to forgiveness as social act.
24
 He says that, 
unlike thanking or gratitude, forgiveness for the same offense can be granted only 
once. Now precisely this does not seem to be true of the inner forgiving from 
one’s heart. This forgiving must repeatedly be renewed and recuperated when 
devastating memories or bitter reproaches re-emerge in our heart, when we blame 
another person in our heart, are overcome by anger and indignation, and are 
tempted to fall out of this inner and total forgiveness of the heart. This can occur 
perhaps upon being provoked by certain acts of the other person that repeat or 
recall his past transgression. Or it can happen by unbearably sad memories that 
evoke bitter thoughts or sarcastic remarks and jokes that demonstrate that our 
inner forgiveness still is painfully falling short of perfect charity, and that we 
must repeatedly descend into the depth of our soul and the gift of charity to truly 
and completely forgive the same wrong-doing in our heart. 
However, what Hildebrand says about the unrepeatability of forgiveness of 
the same trespass, does indeed seem to be true for the social act of forgiveness. In 
this act, I can forgive the same offense only once. For in this act of forgiving I 
destroy once and forever the ‘letter of debt’ and cannot return to the other person 
                                                             
24 In his book, Conduct and Character (12 of January 2010), chapter 9, “Forgiveness,” 
Stephen Schwarz distinguishes two kinds of forgiveness. The first one he calls “initiating 
forgiveness” because it does not presuppose that an offender asks for forgiveness; he 
believes that this forgiveness (in the heart, as I call it) is morally obligatory not only for the 
Christian but for every person because it’s moral goodness is part of morality itself. The 
second one he calls “responsive forgiveness” because it answers a begging forgiveness of 
the trespasser. He says that this forgiveness is a social act, in need to be preceived. Apart 
from the different terminology, and his view, deviating more from Hildebrand’s position 
than from mine, that an absolute obligation to forgive is part of natural ethics, I do not see 
a great difference between our positions. Schwarz adds, however, many very interesting 
observations on forgiveness and its opposites. I do not wish to comment in this short paper, 
on the book on Forgiveness, another important member of the Hildebrand Schülerkreis, 
Professor Mariano Crespo, has published: Das Verzeihen. Eine philosophische 
Untersuchung, (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 2002). It also was published in 
Spanish in the author’s own translation: El perdón. Una investigación filosófica. 2nd 
corrected and enlarged ed. (Madrid: Encuentro 2016). 
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a second time to forgive him the same deed.
25
 In spite of the difference between 
these two acts of forgiving, it seems to me the second, social act of forgiving 
presupposes the first one, at least in a weak form, in order to be appropriate and 
not in some measure hypocritical or “dead”. Moreover, any refusal to forgive in 
words and to speak “I forgive you” to the others pleading for forgiveness 
contradicts the claim to have forgiven another person in one’s heart. The complete 
readiness to the second kind of forgiveness is part of the first one: of the forgiving 
in one’s heart. 
12. Another observation Hildebrand makes in his beautiful treatise on  
forgiveness applies only to “inner forgiveness”, to the inner affective and free 
forgiveness of the heart. Namely, this forgiveness does not stand entirely in our 
own power. It must emerge in us; it is a gift, a grace. 
The deed of forgiving someone, in contrast, the ripping the certificate of his 
debt, stands in the power of our will, at least much more clearly and completely 
than the “inner forgiveness in our heart”. This holds true even if the “social act of 
forgiveness” is not separable from the inner forgiveness, such that Crespo 
understandably thinks they are not two acts. The “social act” or forgiveness as 
well entails, though far less markedly, a dimension of affective response and 
ought to grow out of the inner forgiveness of the heart.  Moreover, the inner 
forgiveness in my heart is not genuine if it does not urge me to express this 
forgiveness towards the offender and to forgive him also in the intersubjective 
way that stands in need of being perceived and responded to. 
If what the other person has done to me, is horrible and grave, as it is in the 
case of a rape, forgiving is terribly difficult and, at least in its depth, only possible 
in the light of the love of God revealed to us in Christ. For the vision of a God 
who IS LOVE itself, and who has poured out his love and mercy on us through 
the God-Man, who united in His single person true divinity and true humanity, 
giving his own life for us, motivates a response of love and unlimited forgiving. It 
is hard or even quite impossible to achieve in a spiritual universe without Christ. 
The forgiving person, who forgives “from his whole and absolute heart” imitates 
in a very special way Christ. He is, like St. Stephen, a living image of His love 
and mercy. 
Forgiveness is thus an immensely deep, complex and mysterious act. It is not 
                                                             
25  See Hildebrand, Moralia. Nachgelassenes Werk. Gesammelte Werke Band 5, 
(Regensburg: Josef Habbel, 1980), p. 335. 
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only a problem but also a mystery. I exclaimed in my youthful falling in love with 
philosophy by thinking about forgiveness, that to claim that understanding the 
mysterious depth of forgiveness is easier than understanding Hegel’s philosophy, 
is the opinion of a fool. And I still uphold the same opinion with the proviso that 
Hegel’s and other false philosophical constructs contain contradictions and are 
therefore not only difficult to understand but cannot even be understood at all. 
The better we understand them, the darker and more contradictory they become. 
In contrast, forgiveness possesses a true and supremely intelligible essence that, 
the deeper we understand it, the more luminous it becomes, and the more we 
grasp its mysteries, the more it spends our minds clarity and light. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
